Personal Prive: C

10 Downing Street London February 5, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

At the suggestion of the Ambassador, I referred to stories indicating that the Prime Minister's projected trip to Moscow had been discussed in advance with me and approved by me. I said I thought that it was undesirable that his statement to the House should contain such implications since, as he knew, I had considerable reservations about the wisdom of the trip at this time. Also it would create embarrassments with our other allies. The Prime Minister said that he would merely state that we, with others, had been informed in advance and not indicate that we had been earlier informed in advance.

With reference to the Berlin situation, I indicated that the program of contingency reaction which I had outlined represented in my opinion the most moderate program that the United States would find acceptable. I pointed out that it fell considerably short of what the Defense Department and the JCS had recommended. I said that if American public opinion got the impression that the Soviet Union had gained a considerable victory in Berlin as a result of pressures upon us by our allies, I thought the reaction on our European policy would be serious and it might affect our NATO posture.

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John Foster Dulles

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